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Abstract
As one of the widely used applications in wireless sensor networks, target
tracking has attracted considerable attention. Although many tracking tech-
niques have been developed, it is still a challenging problem if the network is
under cyber attacks. Inaccurate or false information is maliciously broadcast
by the compromised nodes to their neighbors. They are likely to threaten
the security of the system and result in performance deterioration. In this
paper, a distributed Kalman filtering technique with trust-based dynamic
combination strategy is developed to improve resilience against cyber at-
tacks. Furthermore, it is efficient in terms of communication load, only local
instantaneous estimates are exchanged with the neighboring nodes. Numeri-
cal results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach
by considering random, false data injection and replay attacks.
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1. Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN) combines a large number of low-power
and low-cost tiny sensors with limited processing and communicating re-
sources [1, 2]. It has a wide range of applications, including collaborative
target tracking [3, 4], control of unmanned aerial vehicles [5, 6], automated
vehicle guidance [7, 8] and smart grids [9]. The major benefit of WSNs
is that they perform in-network cooperative and distributed processing [10].
These computationally efficient distributed processing techniques are scalable
with respect to network size and suitable for real-time implementation [11].
For example, system monitoring and security control for large scale power
grids are challenging problems as envisioned by smart grids [12]. Therefore,
distributed processing techniques are desirable to incorporate adaptability
to dynamic network topologies and flexible reconfiguration for subnetwork
faults [13]. Decentralized Kalman filtering is one of the fundamental infor-
mation processing techniques in WSNs [14]. Due to its underlying state space
model that accounts for observational noise, it has proven to be advantageous
in terms of enhanced accuracy and faster convergence rates.
Information fusion plays an important role in distributed processing strate-
gies. In general, it can be classified into four categories: signal or measure-
ment level (low-level), feature or attributes level (medium-level), decision
level (high-level) and combination of various level of information (multilevel)
[15]. Here, we focus on distributed Kalman filtering algorithms in which each
node only shares local estimates with its single-hop neighbors [16]. With
covariance and cross-covariance information available, the linear gains mini-
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mizing the mean squared error have been proposed in [17]. This information
is typically known locally for distributed processing scenarios. Hence, dif-
ferent strategies have been exploited to deal with unknown cross-covariance
matrices. Simple topology-based static techniques are proposed by ignoring
the correlations. Typical static combination rules include uniform, maximum
degree, metropolis, relative degree-variance or no cooperation [18, 19]. How-
ever, such static combination rules are sensitive to the variation of signal and
noise statistics across the network. Alternatively, the unknown correlations
can be explicitly modeled. Covariance intersection was proposed in [20] for
fusion without knowing correlations. Since then, lots of variants have been
proposed in [21, 22, 23, 24] and the computational complexity is further re-
duced in [25, 26, 27, 28]. Recently, ellipsoidal intersection is presented in [29],
it provides smaller covariances than the bounds obtained with covariance in-
tersection. In [30, 31], efficient adaptive combination schemes are developed
to handle the variation of node profiles across the network. Please refer to
[14] for a bibliographic review.
Most of the existing distributed Kalman filtering techniques assume that
all the nodes are working properly [14]. However, WSN is a specific cyber-
physical system and it poses unique security challenges [32, 33, 34, 35].
Firstly, to make networks economically viable, sensors have limited compu-
tation and communication capabilities. Secondly, sensors are often deployed
in accessible areas, increasing the risks of physical attacks. Thirdly, sensor
networks interact closely with environments and people, posing new security
problems. Attackers may cause serious security issues to WSN by launching
cyber attacks, such as random [36], false data injection (FDI) [37, 38, 39, 40]
3
and replay attacks [41, 42]. As mentioned in [43], very few studies have been
directed to distributed state estimation under cyber attacks, where infor-
mation is exchanged between neighboring nodes. Such a scheme has some
potential risks of being attacked, once a node or communication link is com-
promised, the false data or information is diffused to the whole network.
To address these security challenges, trust-based distributed Kalman fil-
tering approach is proposed in [44]. It is a high level fusion based technique,
only local estimates are exchanged. Dynamic combiners are determined by
information accuracy of the estimated covariance matrix or belief divergence
of the current estimates. Recently, multi-agent filtering scheme is combined
with trust-based scheme for distributed state estimation in smart grids [45].
For trust based scheme, each agent associates a trust metric to its neighbors,
information from the untrusted nodes is disregarded. While one limitation of
these methods is that subject judgment is required to choose the threshold.
In this paper, a new trust-based distributed Kalman filtering approach is
proposed, it is resilient against cyber attacks, such as random, false data in-
jection and replay attacks. Different from [44, 45], both the estimated states
and error covariance matrices are exchanged between the neighboring nodes.
Because error covariance matrix provides useful information about the accu-
racy or uncertainty of the estimated states. Meanwhile, K-means clustering
is utilized to classify the trusted and untrusted nodes, it is one of the sim-
plest unsupervised learning algorithms to solve the clustering problem [46].
The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated in target tracking,
meanwhile, it can be applied to other applications, such as distributed power
system state estimation in smart grids. A brief comparison of distributed
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Kalman filtering techniques under different cyber attacks is given in Table
1.
Table 1: Comparison of Distributed Kalman Filtering Techniques under Cyber Attacks
Algorithm Fusion Level Combiner Random FDI Replay
[47] High Static 7 7 7
[48] High Dynamic 3 7 7
[30, 49, 50] Low and High Dynamic 3 7 7
[18, 31] High Dynamic 3 7 3
[44, 45] High (state) Dynamic 3 3 3
Proposed High (state and variance) Dynamic 3 3 3
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• A new trust-based distributed Kalman filtering technique is proposed
to enhance the resilience against cyber attacks. Different from the
existing works, both local state estimate and error covariance matrix
are exchanged between the neighboring nodes.
• In order to bypass the bad data detection techniques utilized by the
defender, attacker may compromise state and error covariance matrix
independently. To enhance the attack resilience of the proposed ap-
proach, for each node, the combiners for state and covariance matrix
are calculated independently.
• Communication load of the proposed approach is lower than that of
the low level measurement fusion scheme. Furthermore, compromised
nodes detection and localization are byproducts of the proposed ap-
proach. Besides distributed Kalman filtering, the proposed fusion strat-
egy can be applied to other distributed filtering techniques.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, problem for-
mulation and preliminaries about Kalman filtering are provided. In Section
3, the proposed trust-based Kalman filtering for distributed estimation over
WSN is introduced. Numerical results are given in Section 4. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. Problem Formulation
The Kalman filter model assumes that the current system state xt evolved
from the prior state xt−1 according to the following equation:
xt = Atxt−1 +wt, (1)
where xt is the system state vector at time t, At is the state transition matrix
and process noise wt is zero mean multivariate normally distributed random
variable with covariance Qt [51]. Measurement of the system yt is given by
yt = Htxt + vt, (2)
where Ht is the transformation or measurement matrix and measurement
noise vt is zero mean multivariate normally distributed random variable with
covarianceRt. For distributed Kalman filter, the model is defined in a similar
manner. At node k, the linear measurement equation is given by
yk,t = Hk,txt + vk,t, (3)
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where Hk,t is the measurement matrix and Rk,t is the covariance matrix of
measurement noise vk,t.
As shown in Fig.1, distributed Kalman filtering based target tracking
in WSN with compromised nodes is considered in this paper. Inaccurate or
false estimates are broadcast by the compromised nodes. We assume that less
than half of the nodes are under cyber attacks. To evaluate the performance
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Figure 1: Target tracking in wireless sensor networks with unreliable nodes. The unreli-
ability may be caused by noisy operational environments and/or cyber attacks.
of the proposed approach, the following cyber attacks are considered:
1. Random Attack: The attacker simply manipulates the sensor observa-
tions with a random attack vector. The random attack can be launched
at any time point and could be a long-term continuous attack or a
short-term intermittent attack.
2. False Data Injection Attack: The adversary can bypass the existing
bad data detection schemes and introduce arbitrary errors to system
states without being detected by system operators.
7
3. Replay Attack: The attacker replays a previous snapshot of a valid
communication packet sequence that contains measurements to deceive
the system.
3. Trust-Based Diffusion Kalman Filtering
Distributed Kalman filter starts from prior mean x˜k,0|−1 and covariance
P˜k,0|−1, where x˜k,i|j denotes the estimate of xi at node k given observations
up to time j and P˜k,i|j is the covariance matrix of the estimation error [49].
3.1. Measurement-Update:
Let us first define
Gk,t = Rk,t +Hk,tP˜k,t|t−1H∗k,t, (4)
where ∗ denotes conjugate transposition. With predicted state x˜k,t|t−1 and
covariance P˜k,t|t−1 available, the state is updated as




rk,t = yk,t −Hk,tx˜k,t|t−1, (6)
and covariance is updated as
P˜k,t|t = P˜k,t|t−1 − P˜k,t|t−1H∗k,tG−1k,tHk,tP˜k,t|t−1. (7)
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Let Nk be the single-hop physical neighbors of node k and includes itself.
State x˜k,t|t and covariance P˜k,t|t are exchanged within nodes in Nk,
3.2. Trust-Based Information Fusion
Combiner ck,t plays a critical role at information fusion stage, it even
influences the performance of the whole network. In general, larger weights
should be assigned to the reliable nodes with accurate local estimates. The
objective is to construct the weights, that are adaptable to the variation of
the estimates. The adaptation is achieved using locally available information
at every node. In this sense, the algorithm is fully distributed, accessing
to global information is not required. Communication burden and energy
consumption of the sensors are reduced [52].
The simplest unsupervised learning algorithm K-means is used to clas-
sify the estimates into trust and untrust clusters. The proposed approach is
majority voting based. Cluster with the largest number of elements is consid-
ered as the trusted set, while the other untrusted clusters are ignored. The
number of clusters is required to apply K-means algorithm and it can be
determined by using hierarchical maximum likelihood clustering approach
[53, 54]. Because majority of the nodes are working properly, for simplic-
ity, a suboptimal solution is considered. Two clusters are assumed to avoid
estimating the actual number of clusters.
For node k, our objective is to put the nk available estimates {x˜ℓ,t|t, ℓ ∈
Nk} into two clusters, which are parameterized by mean vectors m(g), g =
1, 2. Squared Euclidean distance d(zi, zj) is used to describe the distance
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between two points zi and zj, which is defined as
d(zi, zj) = ‖zi − zj‖22 , (8)
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes ℓ2-norm.
The two-step iterative clustering algorithm includes an assignment step
and an update step. In the beginning, m(1) and m(2) are initialized with
random values.








, c = 1, 2. (9)
Let r(g)ℓ be the indicator to describe the assignment of x˜ℓ,t|t to cluster g.
In the assignment step, if mean m(g) is closer to the estimate state, then
r
(g)
ℓ = 1, otherwise r(g)ℓ = 0.
Update Step. To match the sample mean of the data points that have been









, ℓ ∈ Nk, and c = 1, 2. (10)
Repeat the assignment and update steps until the assignments do not change.




k(c), c = 1, 2. (11)
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Then only the data points within cluster gk are considered as trusted esti-
mates, the corresponding nodes are denoted as Ck, the other untrusted nodes
are ignored. Let card(Ck) be the cardinality of set Ck, which measures the
number of elements of the set.
The weight is computed as
wk←l,t =
1
card(Ck) , for l ∈ Ck. (12)




, where operator diag{·} returns a column vector
of the main diagonal elements of a matrix. For node k, the nk available
estimates {p˜ℓ,t|t, ℓ ∈ Nk} are put into two clusters. Let Dk be the trusted
node set, the weight is computed as
λk←l,t =
1
card(Dk) , for l ∈ Dk. (13)











With x˜k,t|t and P˜k,t|t, the time-updates are implemented as
x˜k,t+1|t = Atx˜k,t|t, (16)
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and
P˜k,t+1|t = AtP˜k,t|tA∗t +Qt. (17)
The proposed trust-based distributed Kalman filtering technique is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Trust Based Distributed Kalman Filtering
Initialize x˜k,0|−1 and P˜k,0|−1, for k = 1, 2, · · · , N .
for t = 0 to tmax do
for k = 1 to N do
/* Measurement-Update */
Estimate x˜k,t|t and P˜k,t|t using (5) and (7).
end
for k = 1 to N do
Exchange x˜l,t|t and P˜l,t|t with node k, ℓ ∈ Nk.
/* Information Fusion */
Compute wk,t and λk,t using (12) and (13).
Estimate x˜k,t|t and P˜k,t|t using (14) and (15).
/* Time-Update */




Computer simulations have been carried out to evaluate the performance
of the proposed approach by comparing with uniform [55] and relative degree-
variance [56] fusion schemes. Cyber attacks, such as random, false data
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injection (FDI) and replay attacks are considered. As shown in Fig.2, a fully
connected WSN with 7 nodes is considered. Nodes 02, 04 and 06 are under










Figure 2: A WSN with 7 nodes, nodes 02, 04 and 06 are under cyber attacks.
invariant. The system parameters are as follows:
A =

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 and Hk =
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 . (18)
The states are initialized as x˜k,0|−1 =
[
10 10 1 0
]T
, P˜k,0|−1 = 10I4, co-
variance Q = 0.1I4 and Rk = σ2I2. Here In denotes the identity matrix of
size n.
4.1. Random Attack
The attacker simply manipulates the sensor measurements with a ran-
domly generated attack vector. The attack can be launched at any point in
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time. It might be a long-term continuous attack or a short-term attack. The
actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed trust-based
information fusion approach, as well as the trajectory estimated by the noisy
node is shown in Fig. 3. The corresponding root-mean-square error (RMSE)
performance results are shown in Fig. 4.
For uniform and relative degree-variance weighting schemes, both trust
and untrust nodes are used for information fusion. They are not robust to
random attacks. The error is mainly caused by the compromised nodes. The
greater the attack strength, the larger the RMSE. Compared with uniform
scheme, better performance is achieved for relative degree-variance scheme.
Because smaller weights are given for the compromised nodes. The random
attack is mitigated to some extend. For the proposed scheme, since clustering
techniques are used to classify the nodes into trust and untrust sets. Only the
trust nodes are used for information fusion. The effects of the compromised
nodes are eliminated. Therefore, it is robust to the random attack and lowest
RMSE is achieved.
4.2. False Data Injection Attack
For FDI attack, it assumes that the attacker knows the system model and
the parameters. It can bypass the residual based bad data detection tech-
niques that are widely used by the system operators. To launch the attack,
attack vector ak,t|t is added to the local estimate x˜k,t|t. In the simulation,
the elements of the attack vector is generated from a normal distribution
N(µ, σ2) with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
The actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed
trust-based diffusion approach, as well as the trajectory estimated by the
14















Node 02: SNR = −10 dB
Actual Trajectory
Trust−based Trajectory
Figure 3: The actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed trust-
based information fusion approach, as well as the trajectory estimated by the noisy node.





















Uniform [55]: SNR = −20 dB
Uniform [55]: SNR = −15 dB
Uniform [55]: SNR = −10 dB
Relative [56]: SNR = −20 dB
Relative [56]: SNR = −15 dB
Relative [56]: SNR = −10 dB
Trust: SNR = −20 dB
Trust: SNR = −15 dB
Trust: SNR = −10 dB
Figure 4: The instantaneous RMSE for uniform [55], relative degree-variance [56] and
the proposed trust-based fusion schemes under different SNR scenarios.
node under FDI attack are shown in Fig. 5. The corresponding RMSE
performance results are shown in Fig. 6.
For uniform and relative degree-variance weighting schemes, all the 7
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nodes are used for information fusion. They are not robust to FDI attacks
and the compromised nodes will cause large estimation errors. Better perfor-
mance is achieved for relative degree-variance scheme as compared to uniform
weighting scheme. Larger µ and/or σ will contribute to larger RMSE. For
the proposed scheme, only the trusted nodes are used for information fusion.
It is robust and the effects of FDI attacks are eliminated. Compared with
the other two schemes, lowest RMSE is achieved for the proposed scheme.















Node with FDI Attack: µ = 5, σ = 2
Actual Trajectory
Trust−based Trajectory
Figure 5: The actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed trust-
based information fusion approach, as well as the trajectory estimated by the node under
FDI attack.
4.3. Reply Attack
In the last simulation, reply attack is considered. The attacker replays
previous snapshots of a valid communication packet sequence that contains
local estimates to deceive the system. For the three compromised nodes, the
previous states are used to launch replay attacks. At time t, for nodes 02, 04
and 06, x˜t−τ , τ = 1, 2, 3, are broadcast to their neighboring nodes. Since they
16























Uniform [55]: µ = 5, σ = 4
Uniform [55]: µ = 5, σ = 2
Uniform [55]: µ = 0, σ = 2
Relative [56]: µ = 5, σ = 4
Relative [56]: µ = 5, σ = 2
Relative [56]: µ = 0, σ = 2
Trust: µ = 5, σ = 4
Trust: µ = 5, σ = 2
Trust: µ = 0, σ = 2
Figure 6: The instantaneous RMSE for uniform [55], relative degree-variance [56] and
the proposed trust-based fusion schemes under FDI attacks, SNR = 10 dB.
are the actual states of the system, so they can bypass the residual based
bad data detection schemes.
The actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed
trust-based approach is shown in Fig. 7. The corresponding RMSE perfor-
mance results are shown in Fig. 8. For uniform and relative degree-variance
weighting schemes, as in the previous two simulations, they are not robust
to replay attacks. While for the proposed approach, it outperforms the other
two schemes and again lowest RMSE is achieved.
Remark 1. The proposed approach is a majority voting based scheme. As
shown in the simulation results, robust performance is achieved for the pro-
posed approach, provided that a minority of the sensors are compromised. It
might be a realistic assumption. Because the attacker is either limited access
to nodes, due to physical protection by system operators, or limited resources
to compromise large scale networks [37]. While for the proposed trust-based
17
















Figure 7: The actual trajectory and the estimated trajectory using the proposed trust-
based diffusion approach, three nodes are under replay attacks.























Uniform [55]: τ = 3
Uniform [55]: τ = 2
Uniform [55]: τ = 1
Relative [56]: τ = 3
Relative [56]: τ = 2
Relative [56]: τ = 1
Trust: τ = 3
Trust: τ = 2
Trust: τ = 1
Figure 8: The instantaneous RMSE for uniform [55], relative degree-variance [56] and
the proposed trust-based fusion schemes under replay attacks, SNR = 10 dB.
approach, the limitation can be overcome by introducing a subset of secured
nodes, which are special nodes that can be highly trusted [57].
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5. Conclusion
We propose a trust-based distributed Kalman filtering scheme for target
tracking under malicious cyber attacks. Clustering technique is adapted to
remove the bad data and/or the inaccurate estimates. After clustering, a
dynamic combiner is obtained. Furthermore, it is robust to the cyber attacks,
such as random, false data injection and reply attacks. And compromised
nodes detection and localization are byproducts of the proposed approach.
Even though the proposed technique is introduced in target tracking, the key
idea can be applied to other applications, such as navigation, smart grids.
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